From the beginning, the groups of people most interested in studying and mitigating carbon emissions have set the terms of the “global warming” debate—to the detriment of policy change. As historian Joshua Howe argues, climate scientists adopted a “science first” approach to political debates, which tragically omitted the cultural, social, and human ramifications of global warming. Scientists’ and environmentalists’ reliance on “science as a driver of politician action also gave their opponents a clear target: science itself” (Howe). Opponents of international efforts to curb carbon emissions realized that the best way to shift the political discussion in their favor was to challenge the science behind global warming. With the sinking of the Kyoto Protocol, it appears that opponents and conservatives successfully achieved their goals in curbing multilateral cooperation on climate changes.
At the heart of the Kyoto Protocol “issue” was the exemptions from responsibility for carbon mitigation for the developing world (Howe). The Bush administration was hesitant to adopt a protocol that laid out no binding requirements for developing countries, especially China and India. The argument for allowing exemptions for developing countries was two-fold: 1) historically, these countries had contributed less to the climate problem and, 2) these countries still needed room to grow economically (Howe). The U.S. rejected these proposals as they feared an economic disadvantage would result if American companies had to meet stricter regulations than foreign competitors who did not have to. Additionally, the Bush administration adopted a “no regrets” policy on the environment. This was an inverse spin on traditional environmental policy as Bush’s proposal embraced an “economic precautionary principle”: any principle or action that curbed environmental degradation was assumed to represent an economic threat unless proven otherwise (Howe). These factors led to the failure of Senate ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
I think there are several factors that contribute to the United States resistance in signing international agreements on climate change. For conservative lawmakers and politicians, there’s an issue with international treaties that, if ratified by the Senate, could potentially constrain domestic decision–making and policy agendas. This strikes at a core belief of the U.S.—individualism. Also, as Howe argues, since the 1990s, there has been a lot of pushback against the “scientific consensus” in the science community regarding certainty that global warming exists. This has led to an ideological division on the issue of global warming, and makes it difficult for the Senate to ratify an international, multilateral treaty. Ok, last factor. I also believe that there’s an issue of “fairness” that Howe touched on; if developing countries (some major emitters) do not have to bear the burden of cutting down on carbon emissions, then why should the United States? This becomes a kind of blame game where everyone (especially the U.S.) is pointing fingers at other countries, and trying to figure out who bears the most blame for climate change, which makes it really !!! difficult !!! to!!! get!!! things!!! done!!!
Will Wright 