The assumption that more science will lead to better policy is often overly simplistic. Historian Joshua P. Howe, in Behind the Curve, shows that even as climate scientists reached a consensus on the dangers of CO₂ emissions, political divisions deepened. This disconnect between scientific certainty and political action became especially evident during the late 1980s and 1990s. One key example is the reluctance of the George H. W. Bush (Bush Sr.) administration to take bold international action on climate change, particularly regarding the Kyoto Protocol.
The Bush Sr. administration was hesitant to sign on to strong international climate agreements like the Kyoto Protocol for several reasons. First, there was a deep concern about the potential economic impacts of emissions reductions. Policymakers feared that committing to mandatory emissions cuts could hurt U.S. industries and lead to job losses, especially in energy-intensive sectors. There was also a belief that the U.S. would be at a competitive disadvantage if major developing countries like China or India were not held to the same standards. This fear of economic imbalance made multilateral agreements politically risky.
Second, climate change was increasingly seen as a partisan issue rather than a scientific one. While scientists were becoming more certain about the human causes of global warming, political leaders—especially conservatives—began framing climate policy as an attack on economic freedom and national sovereignty. Right-wing think tanks and fossil fuel industry lobbyists amplified skepticism about climate science and promoted doubt to delay regulation. This growing alliance between industry and conservative politicians made it even harder to build bipartisan support for international action.
Even today, the U.S. government continues to resist binding international agreements on climate change for many of the same reasons: concerns about economic costs, fear of loss of sovereignty, and political polarization. Some Americans distrust global institutions and fear that international agreements will force the U.S. to follow rules made by other countries. Others question whether global cooperation is even possible when many countries have very different priorities.
Ultimately, Howe shows that facts alone aren’t enough to change policy. Climate science may be clear, but policy is shaped by values, power, and interests. Overcoming resistance to international cooperation on climate change will require more than just data—it will require building trust, addressing economic fears, and reshaping political incentives.
Will Wright 