In Behind the Curve, Joshua Howe challenges the idea that more scientific knowledge automatically leads to political action regarding climate change. Howe’s explanation of U.S. climate policy (especially during the Bush Sr. administration) shows that even as scientists grew more confident about the dangers of rising CO₂ levels, political progress actually became more difficult to achieve. One of the clearest examples of this is the hesitancy the U.S. showed in signing the Kyoto Protocol, despite the strong scientific warnings about the dangers of abundant greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.
Although the Kyoto Protocol wasn’t actually negotiated until 1997 when the Clinton Administration was in office, the Bush Sr. administration laid a foundation of skepticism and hesitancy surrounding binding international climate agreements. Under Bush Sr. the U.S. did adopt the UNFCCC, but this was a non-binding agreement that treated all countries (developed and developing) equally in its expectations. As Howe argues, the hesitation that was perpetuated by the Bush Sr. administration wasn’t just because they had doubts about the science; a lot of it had to do with economic concerns and politically calculated actions. Following what has been termed as a “no regrets” approach, the Bush Sr. administration only supported climate policies that would also support the economy. In Howe’s words, this attitude matched “a long-standing tradition of prioritizing economic interests above all else in American foreign policy decision making” (194). To put it bluntly, the Bush Sr. administration and other fiscal conservatives were concerned that mandatory emissions cuts would hurt U.S. industries and lead to higher costs for consumers. Since Bush had famously promised “no new taxes,” any policy resembling a carbon tax (or anything that could raise energy prices) was politically risky for him.
Another reason behind U.S. resistance to binding protocols for environmental sustainability was fairness. U.S. leaders argued it wouldn’t be fair for developed countries like themselves to take on binding emissions cuts under the Kyoto Protocol while large developing countries (notably China and India) weren’t held to the same standards. This concern was formalized in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which passed in the senate in 1997. It said that out of concern for its economy, the U.S. wouldn’t support any treaty that didn’t include commitments from developing countries. Even though global cooperation is necessary to lower greenhouse gas emissions, the U.S. didn’t want to take part in any agreements that might limit its economic flexibility.
Howe points out that the U.S.’s resistance to international agreements on climate change also had to do with deeper ideological and political dynamics. For example, after the Cold War, environmental leadership didn’t seem as strategically important to U.S. foreign policy. Plus, with globalization becoming more prominent, there was growing fear that strong (binding) environmental regulations would make American industries less competitive. Additionally, industry lobbyists and conservative politicians worked hard to promote scientific uncertainty, and used it as justification for delaying action.
In the end, Howe’s arguments make it clear that solving climate change isn’t just about having better data or presenting the science in a more straightforward way. As he writes, “behind the curve lies a series of contextually specific interactions between individuals, institutions, ideas, and interests” (4). Tackling climate change requires engaging with these broader political, economic, and social systems—not just presenting more scientific information that “proves” it exists. Even as science has become more certain, the political debates surrounding climate change have been less productive because they were shaped by competing priorities and power structures. Especially when powerful interests are involved, knowing something is a problem doesn’t necessarily lead to action.
Will Wright 