The collapse of the industrial era since the 1970s can be credited to the shift of uncertainty for future economic stability for many working-class citizens. Specifically, analyizing Pittsburgh’s transition from an industrial steel to a service-based economy. The transition did not erase the working class but instead restructured the functioning of this population in ways that reinforced, rather than alleviated, inequality. The fall of the steel industry in Pittsburgh forced many working-class families to find alternative sources of income, which resulted in the “working-class population [being thrown] back onto the welfare state for survival” (p. 181). In 1979, Pittsburgh (9.7%) had one of the highest rates of unemployment in the United States, compared to the nation (7.8%) itself (p. 187); this means that nearly 10% of the U.S. unemployed population could be found in Pittsburgh alone. The rise of this population led to severe financial and employment need for this city to accommodate the upheaval of this growing unemployed population.
However, rather than create these opportunities that would benefit the population, a labor market that matched the previous one never emerged. People with specific skill sets and qualifications were trying to find anything that was semi-related to what had been their jobs for years, decades even (p. 192). But skills in manual labor were becoming irrelevant. Many people started resorting to applying for anything and everything. For many of these people, when their source of income is gone, they are left with nothing to fall back on financially. With this blockage of work for men, the population of women working rapidly increased. During this time, the shift from a labor workforce to a domestic workforce emerged. This shift was not just about economic survival; it was a redefinition of labor itself. The male-dominated world of industrial labor, which had once been the backbone of working-class identity, was replaced by a feminized, racialized service economy that lacked the same level of pay, benefits, or job security.
The economic consequences of deindustrialization in Pennsylvania during the 1970s and 1980s were not merely about the loss of jobs; they represented a systematic erosion of working-class power and economic stability. As the steel industry collapsed, the region lost its primary source of high-paying, unionized jobs. The healthcare sector’s rise, while providing some jobs, was not a fair replacement. Winant writes, “The new healthcare economy was less about providing a living wage and more about filling the gaps left by the old industrial economy” (p. 170). The new jobs were often part-time, non-union, and underpaid. The promise of employment stability during the industrial era turned into temporary solutions for job security, taking whatever employment was available, whether you had the skills for it or not.
Deindustrialization was another abused industry that was quickly used as a political ploy by politicians, including Richard Nixon. As Winant points out, the collapse of the steel sector “undermined the power of organized labor” and left many working-class people feeling abandoned by the Democratic Party (p. 172). This sense of betrayal was worsened by the Democratic Party’s emphasis on social movements like anti-war demonstrations and civil rights. This focus caused them to ignore the economic problems of the deindustrialized working class. Deindustrialization also deepened the divides between groups, especially for POC and women. Many working-class men, particularly white men, resented the growing number of women and POC in the healthcare industry. However, this change in the worker demographic was being framed as an “economic necessity”. Winant critiques this reasoning, stating that “The white working class was not just economically displaced but politically fragmented by deindustrialization, creating space for a more racially exclusive notion of class identity” (p. 177). These divisions were not just about class—they were about race and gender, which continued to shape who could access economic power in the new service economy.
It is demeaning to a person to believe that because they are in need, giving them anything is better than nothing. Especially when they are at the mercy of navigating and co-existing in a forced environment. In this case, the people—especially the POC communities—assumed they had “birthright” to the job security and stability the steel industry provided, and why would they think differently? Don’t Americans love to tout themselves as a people who go after what they want? That if you work for it and towards it, then it is yours? Isn’t it also normalized that if you follow in the footsteps of your previous familial generation, this could also guarantee security? I guess all of this only applies to the wealthy. Reading this—only a small portion of the truth—shows that the promise of security in life is a fantasy for the working class. I guess a birthright has an income requirement. The people in Pittsburgh were uprooted from their lives, not only for their generation but for the next to come. The welfare state that people are expected to praise for its mere existence was not there for them when they needed it the most. An attempt to implement a reform program to help restart their lives got maybe $3.3 million a year? And money was not an issue. How much money did the prison, which was overcrowded with the unemployed, receive to maintain this institution? Over $300 million a year. They put almost 100 times more in finances toward incarceration than reforming and restructuring programs. When these people needed those programs the most, where was the government to strengthen those programs? All these priorities showed that the government was not for the people; it was all just a business. Even the owner of US Steel that transitioned out of the steel business into oil said it: “[They’re] not in the business of making steel. [They’re] in the business of making profits” (187).
I really enjoyed reading your commentary on Winant’s article, Angelica! I especially appreciated that you highlighted the point he made about mass incarceration accelerating and the prison system prospering during the collapse of the labor market. At a time when the financial state of our nation was supposedly so weak that we struggled investing in federal food aid and child care programs, it is rather ironic that Pennsylvania found $300 million to invest in prison construction throughout the 1980s. To me, it seems as if Pennsylvania was only willing to invest in those that had lost their jobs during deindustrialization (specifically POC or individuals from low socioeconomic classes) after it was too late—once they were already in prison. I can’t help but wonder how history would have played out had we invested that money into social institutions that kept people housed, fed, and educated—all before they were locked behind bars.
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