George Wallace and Richard Nixon tapped into the stereotype of “elite doves” and “reactionary hardhats” for their political advantage by uniting a coalition of workers who were becoming disillusioned with the Democratic party. By pushing the narrative of Democrats being radically anti-war, anti-patriotic and elitist snobs, the rhetoric of Nixon and Wallace convinced this group of white working-class Americans that the Democratic party did not address their issues. Instead, this group of Americans turned to the Republican party for their embracement of traditional values and economic advancement.
I believe that it was not the anti-war left that solely antagonized white working-class Americans, and it was instead a much more complex frustration of the white working-class that felt alienated by the “radical” and elitist anti-war protestors, the emphasis of the Democratic party on social movements, and the targeting of social efforts such as affirmative action programs in dominantly white working-class spaces. This group of individuals felt that “none of the social programs of the great society period were aimed at championing the new and growing social and economic grievances of all working people” (183). Programs aimed at the advancement of the Black community were felt by these individuals to be directly in conflict with their interests as white workers. Part of this sentiment was fueled by the stereotyping of Democrats by campaigns such as Nixon’s and Wallace’s.
While I believe that if the Democratic party presented a unified position on the war and didn’t embrace the civil rights movement as strongly, they may not have alienated Southern Democrats and working-class whites. Thus, it’s possible that these changes—or the lack thereof—could have prevented the political realignment. Additionally, if these harmful stereotypes of “hardhats” and “doves” wasn’t furthered by political campaigns and the media, there may have been less alienation of the white-working class and more compromise could have been reached. However, the absence of these shifts would have significantly shaped the political stance and ideology of the Democratic party, both then and in the future. In fact, one could argue that the party would have evolved into something vastly different from what it is today. So, while prevention of the political realignment may have been possible, it likely wouldn’t have been possible without profound change of the party’s stances and values. I believe this highlights the limited political flexibility inherent in a two-party system. A diverse range of people were effectively forced into political parties that may have aligned with some of their ideals, but certainly not all of them. This often left individuals having to compromise on issues they cared deeply about in order to fit into the broader political landscape.
Will Wright 
I like how you mentioned how Nixon and Wallace pushed the narrative of the Democratic party being anti-patriotic and elitist as I think this played a large part in the political realignment of the working class. I agree that if the division between “doves” and “hardhats” was not pushed in the media and by politicians, then there may have been less alienation. I also like how you pointed out that while it may have been possible for the Democratic party to avoid this realignment, the party would have had to change its stances and values causing the party to evolve into something different than what it has. I also think that the narrative pushed of an elitist left was pushed so hard that it is still felt today and may have been too much for the Democratic party to come back from.
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Lilly,
I thoroughly enjoyed reading your post. I liked how you phrased “complex frustrations” in response to the white working-class issue outside of the anti-war left movements. You actually make a similar point to mine in your final response that forcing political ideology with to align people’s values cannot always co-exist. I believe you are right in saying that different or absent shifts would have changed the trajectory of how the Democratic Party functions today. However, I believe the issue with our then Democratic Party’s realignment went far beyond the “party’s stances and values” (I also liked how you challenged the notion of a two-party system being adequate enough). The problem of the time with the inflexibility of evolving these stances and values were—and very much still are—rooted in systemic issues. I will always go back to this group being referred to as the white working-class. The real issues, let’s take race, for example, can rarely be abolished within the same generation. All this to say, the Democratic Party never stood a chance at fighting for all working-class people. What makes this response worse is the reason was not only the narrative being pushed by the Republican Party, it was also because of the democratic leaders who did not align with the intersection of other marginalized and underrepresented people being included in their advocacy (this is a somewhat sociological response, I apologize).
Wonderful post.
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Great post! I enjoyed reading your discussion about the “limited political flexibility inherent in a two-party system.” I agree with this statement, and the fact that our two-party system often forces individuals to compromise on certain issues in order to align with one political party over the other. This leaves me thinking that because they already felt as if they didn’t truly align with either political party, white working-class Americans were particularly vulnerable to the campaign tactics used by Nixon and Wallace. With that being said, I agree with you that completely preventing the political realignment likely wouldn’t have been possible without essentially redefining what each party stood for. In this context, occasional political realignment seems unavoidable, especially in our two-party system.
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