In the words of historian Penny Lewis, “we have misremembered the working class as particularly hawkish during Vietnam.” As opposed to wealthy, college-educated, suburban-living White Americans, White members of the working class were often portrayed in popular media as bigoted, simple-minded red-necks. As Lewis illustrates, although these images of the White working class were not a reality, they had very real implications on the political and social change occuring at this time in United States History. Specifically, presidential candidates Wallace and Nixon were able to tap into these stereotypes using their respective populist approaches and gain notable political support from the White working class.
Wallace, the Independent candidate, used an “us vs. them” approach to align himself with the White working class. Essentially, his goal was to unite White working-class individuals against the press (who he acknowledged had perpetuated largely untrue stereotypes) and the federal government (who he said had let them down enough already). Nixon, the Republican candidate, appealed to members of the White working class—who often have very traditional values—using rhetoric of “law and order.” He also coined the term “the silent majority” to describe this social group, which he was able to use to his advantage because of its ambiguity. As Lewis writes, “the myriad voices of working people were not being captured or set forth in the public discussion, and it was essential that such silence be maintained for Nixon and his party to effectively speak for them.”
Although some of the White working class was upset by the anti-war protests—particularly the way in which these protests were being carried out—this was not the only frustration they faced during the Vietnam War. Economically, the Democratic Labor Unions felt as if the Democratic Party was not responsive to their wants and needs. Factories were closing, people were losing their jobs, and no one was taking any action. Socially, the welfare state was expanding, however, as Lewis points out, these programs were paid for through regressive taxes and the burden ended up falling “disproportionately on lower-income people.” The draft and desegregation orders were also disproportionately affecting the working class. All-in-all there was a level of resentment from the White working class toward other groups, specifically the media and the elitist Whites. This fueled the political division that is characteristic of this time period.
I do not think the Democratic Party could have entirely prevented this emerging political alignment, largely because there were many different cultural and political movements occurring simultaneously at this time period. In this sense, at least some degree of political realignment seems inevitable to me. However, I do think the Democratic Party could have definitely made more of an effort to acknowledge and address the concerns of the working class. As Lewis points out, many working class individuals stayed economically liberal, so if their other concerns would have been at the very least acknowledged, they may have been more inclined to stay with the Democratic Party. One way they could have addressed social concerns, as Lewis discusses, would have been employing a more universal approach to social welfare. In contrast to the means-tested approach that the United States still uses today, universal welfare states (as seen in Scandinavia, for example) provide comprehensive social services to all citizens, regardless of their demographics. If something like this—or even just aspects of it—would have been implemented in the United States, it would have likely mitigated feelings of resentment from the White working class by ensuring a basic standard of living for everyone. In turn, I think this could have made the political realignment less drastic than it ended up being.
Will Wright 